Amiral Cihat Yaycı’ya göre: Babülmendep tuzağını Somali’de bozduk
GZT · 2026-07-29
💡 Quick Take
1. Houthi forces in Yemen announced an embargo and active maritime blockade targeting Saudi Arabia and Red Sea shipping around the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
2. Daily ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb dropped by 50 percent, driving an 89 percent increase in commercial vessels rerouting around Africa's Cape of Good Hope.
3. Rerouting around the African continent added up to 29 additional transit days and increased operational costs per oil tanker by 2.5 million dollars, inflating global energy and freight prices.
4. The United States formalized a strategic defense agreement with Saudi Arabia while passing the financial burden of regional military operations onto Gulf nations.
5. Türkiye solidified its strategic foothold near the Horn of Africa through military deployment, army training, and port management in Somalia.
📊 Detailed Explanation
The geopolitical dynamic surrounding the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait—a 35-kilometer-wide maritime passage bounded by Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia—has rapidly deteriorated following Houthi blockade declarations. The Iran-backed Houthi militia controlling North Yemen has effectively restricted passage not through formal naval blockades, but by firing coastal missiles, deploying armed speedboats, and using shoulder-fired weapons against commercial vessels. As a result of these targeted attacks, average daily ship transits through both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb dropped by 50 percent, falling from an average of 67 ships down to 32 or 33.
This operational buildup follows a historical pattern of Western military deployment across the region. Under the initial justification of combatting Somali maritime piracy—a threat that accounted for less than one billion dollars in ransom and blackmail—nations including the US, UK, France, Germany, China, India, and Türkiye spent over 15 billion dollars establishing permanent bases in Bahrain, Djibouti, Somaliland, and Saudi Arabia. This disproportionate expenditure allowed foreign powers to surround the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and secure long-term military footholds along crucial Middle Eastern and East African coastlines.
The economic significance of these maritime choke points cannot be overstated. Approximately 20 percent of global oil transits through the Strait of Hormuz, while 11 percent of world oil and 25 percent of global maritime traffic pass through Bab-el-Mandeb. Furthermore, 40 percent of all trade between Asia and Europe relies on this short Red Sea route. Controlling these passages enables external powers to regulate commercial flows between Europe and major Asian economies like China, Japan, and South Korea.
To mitigate these choke point vulnerabilities, Saudi Arabia utilizes the East-West Yanbu pipeline and Egypt's Sumed pipeline system terminating at Sidi Kerir to move oil from the Red Sea into the Mediterranean. However, depth restrictions on supertankers prohibit vessels from operating at full load capacity along these routes. Consequently, Saudi Arabia's daily export throughput via these alternative maritime segments drops from its normal capacity of seven million barrels down to roughly two and a half million barrels per day.
As a direct result of Red Sea security threats, commercial shipping traffic navigating around Africa's Cape of Good Hope surged by 89 percent compared to the previous year. Bypassing the Suez Canal adds up to 29 additional travel days for shipments bound for East Asian markets such as Taiwan. This extended voyage increases transit times by 40 percent, elevates transport and insurance costs between 20 and 50 percent, and adds approximately 2.5 million dollars in expense per oil tanker. These added operational costs disproportionately burden Asian export economies while relatively favoring Western domestic markets.
From an American strategic perspective, regional instability serves dual economic and military objectives. Washington utilizes the Houthi threat to justify its regional force presence while collecting direct payments from Gulf allies—including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE—for munitions and military operations. By expending older or retiring weapon stockpiles in defense of Gulf infrastructure, the United States finances the replenishment of its own military inventory and stimulates domestic defense manufacturing at full capacity.
This dynamic culminates in a formalized bilateral defense arrangement between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Under this framework, Riyadh aligns its strategic resources directly with Washington, paving the way for potential participation in the Abraham Accords and joint military actions against Houthi positions. Meanwhile, broader destabilization tactics are observed along Pakistan's border in Balochistan and Jammu & Kashmir, where newly emerging armed groups exhibiting PKK-like uniforms and organization target the region's sole nuclear-armed Muslim state.
Amid these regional realignments, Türkiye's long-term investments in Somalia serve as a crucial counterweight. Ankara's deployment of naval and land forces, training of the Somali national army, and operation of major Somali ports, airports, and hospitals ensure that Türkiye maintains a direct strategic voice in Horn of Africa diplomacy and Red Sea maritime security calculations.
🎯 News Analyst Opinion
Admiral Cihat Yaycı presents a compelling structural analysis regarding how major global powers convert regional choke point instability into long-term strategic dominance. The premise that Western naval deployments are calibrated to manage rather than eliminate local threats is well-supported by historical data—most notably the multi-billion-dollar military apparatus constructed around the Horn of Africa under the original banner of anti-piracy operations. By maintaining a controlled level of friction in Bab-el-Mandeb, Western planners preserve justification for a permanent military footprint while shifting regional defense costs onto Gulf balance sheets.
The global economic consequences of these maritime disruptions will severely penalize energy-importing and Asian manufacturing nations. An 89 percent surge in rerouted shipping around the Cape of Good Hope, combined with a 2.5 million dollar premium per oil tanker, guarantees persistent inflationary pressure across supply chains. Should global oil supply access remain constrained by over 20 percent, crude prices risk pushing back above 100 to 120 dollars per barrel, triggering sharp trade deficits and broader macroeconomic stress for vulnerable emerging markets.
Furthermore, the strategy of monetizing Gulf security through defense sales and stockpile replacement presents substantial long-term risks. While American defense contractors benefit immediately from accelerated production cycles funded by Gulf nations, relying on low-level conflict management risks accidental escalation. Pipeline bypasses like Saudi Arabia's Yanbu system cannot fully absorb regional disruptions when sea-based loading capacities are reduced by nearly two-thirds, leaving global supply chains exposed to sudden shocks.
In this context, Türkiye's multi-faceted presence in Somalia stands out as a highly effective model of strategic forward positioning. By combining military training, infrastructure management, and humanitarian partnerships, Ankara has secured an indispensable seat at the table in Horn of Africa governance without relying on unilateral force projection. Stakeholders should closely watch how Turkish maritime diplomacy leverages its Somali footprint to protect trade routes and counter foreign encirclement across the broader Red Sea corridor.
Kanal: GZT